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PRISONERS' RIGHTS
Estelle v. Gamble, 97 S. Ct. 285 (1976).
Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners Labor Union Inc., 97 S. Ct. 2532 (1977).
Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817 (1977).
The United States Supreme Court last Term
added Estelle v. Gamble,' Jones v. North Carolina
Prisoners' Labor Union, Inc. ,2 and Bounds v.
Smith' to the growing body of case law dealing
with prisoners' rights. While those cases raised
diverse issues and were analytically distinct, as
a group they indicate that the Court is becom-
ing less willing to intervene between prisoners
and prison administration to vindicate inmate
claims of constitutional violations. The rights
examined in the prison context included free-
dom of speech and association, freedom from
cruel and unusual punishment, and the right
of access to the courts. Ironically, access to the
courts has been greatly expanded while the
other rights have suffered.
CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT
In Estelle v. Gamble, an inmate of a Texas
penitentiary filed a pro se complaint under 42
U.S.C. § 19834 claiming that inadequate medi-
cal care he received at the institution consti-
tuted cruel and unusual punishment in viola-
tion of the eighth amendment.5 The complaint
named the director of the Texas Department
of Correction, the warden of the prison, and
1 429 U.S. 97 (1976).
2 97 S. Ct. 2532 (1977).
3 430 U.S. 817 (1977).
4 429 U.S. at 98. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970) provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute,
ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any
State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be
subjected, any citizen of the United States or
other person within the jurisdiction thereof to
the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or
immunities secured by the Constitution and
laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an
action at law, suit in equity, or other proper
proceeding for redress.
I The eighth amendment provides: "Excessive bail
shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed,
nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted." U.S.
CONST. amend. VIII. The ban against cruel and
unusual punishments was held to be applicable to
the states through the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment in Robinson v. California,
370 U.S. 660 (1962).
the chief prison medical officer as defendants.
The Supreme Court, in an opinion by Justice
Marshall, held that deliberate indifference to
the serious medical needs of prisoners violates
the eighth amendment. However, the Court
did not find Gamble's allegations sufficient to
state a claim of such a violation.
Gamble allegedly suffered a serious back
injury while on his prison job. Several doctors
examined him at various times over a three-
month period. The doctors failed to adequately
diagnose Gamble's back injury and responded
to his complaints by prescribing pain pills and
muscle relaxants. The doctors also failed to
detect his high blood pressure, although he
was eventually treated for that condition. De-
spite continuing pain, Gamble was ordered
back to work. When he refused, prison officials
imposed various disciplinary measures includ-
ing solitary confinement. He also alleged that
prison officers interfered with the treatment
he did receive.
6
The District Court for the Southern District
of Texas in an unpublished opinion dismissed
the complaint for failure to state a claim upon
which relief could be granted.' The Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reinstated the
complaint8 on the grounds that the treatment
6 Gamble alleged that during one period of solitary
confinement he complained of chest pains and "blank
outs" and requested to see a doctor. This request
was not granted for almost 12 hours. He was then
examined and hospitalized. A doctor diagnosed an
irregular heart rhythm and placed him on medica-
tion. Gamble returned to administrative segregation
two days later. The next day he again had chest
pains and requested to see a doctor. His request was
denied. He repeated his request the next day and
was again denied medical attention. 429 U.S. at 101.
Gamble waived all claims with regard to the treat-
ment received for his heart and high blood pressure
conditions: "[H]is complaint is 'based solely on the
lack of diagnosis and inadequate treatment of his
back injury.' "Id. at 107 (quoting Response to Petition
for Certiorari at 4).
7 516 F.2d 937, 938 (5th Cir. 1975).8Id.
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was so wholly inadequate that it amounted to
cruel and unusual punishment. The court
found the treatment inadequate because it was
aimed only at relieving pain instead of curing
the injury.' It noted the absence of basic diag-
nostic techniques such as X-ray examination to
support its conclusion that no effort had been
made to determine the nature and severity of
Gamble's injury. 10
Prison authorities appealed, and the Su-
preme Court granted certiorari." The Su-
preme Court reversed the court of appeals
decision pertaining to the medical personnel.
It vacated that portion of the decision directed
to correctional officials and remanded the case
to the court of appeals with instructions to
determine whether a claim had been stated
against them.
The Court briefly reviewed the history of
the constitutional ban of cruel and unusual
punishments. Although originally intended to
proscribe only such "barbarous" forms of pun-
ishment as death by torture,'12 the ban has
more recently been held to proscribe all pun-
ishments which "involve the unnecessary and
wanton infliction of pain."'2 The Court con-
cluded that failure to provide adequate medical
care might fall under this definition since even
minor cases "may result in pain and suffering
which no one suggests would serve any peno-
logical purposes."'1 4 The Court elaborated:
[D]eliberate indifference to serious medical
needs of prisoners constitutes the "unnecessary
and wanton infliction of pain" . . . proscribed
by the Eighth Amendment. This is true whether
the indifference is manifested by prison doctors
in their response to the prisoner's needs or by
prison guards in intentionally denying or delay-
ing access to medical care or intentionally inter-
fering with the treatment once prescribed. 2
9 Id. at 941.
10 Id.
11 424 U.S. 907 (1976).
12 429 U.S. at 102 (quoting Granucci, "Nor Cruel
and Unusual Punishments Inflicted": The Original Mean-
ing, 57 CAL. L. REV. 839, 842 (1969)).
13 429 U.S. at 103 (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428
U.S. 153, 172-73 (1976) (plurality opinion)).
14 429 U.S. at 103.
"SId. at 104-05 (footnotes and citation omitted)
(quoting Gregg v. Georgia). The Court illustrated
the "deliberate indifference" standard in footnote
references to various cases in which the allegations
of the complaint were sufficient to raise a constitu-
tional claim for inadequate medical care. Id. at 103-
04 nn.10-12.
The Court emphasized that "deliberate indif-
ference" does not encompass medical malprac-
tice and mere negligence. These do not become
"constitutional violation(s) merely because the
victim is a prisoner."'"
The Court referred to Louisiana ex rel. Francis
v. Resweber'7 where it held that it was not cruel
and unusual punishment to subject a con-
demned prisoner to a second attempt at elec-
trocution after an accidental power failure had
miscarried the first.' 8 By analogy, the Gamble
Court concluded, "in the medical context, an
inadvertent failure to provide medical care
cannot be said to constitute a 'wanton infliction
of unnecessary pain.' ",s The reference to Re-
sweber clearly indicates that "deliberate indiffer-
ence" describes a degree of misconduct well
beyond accidental mistreatment.
The Court noted that the allegations of Gam-
ble's pro se complaints were to be construed
liberally, as required by Haines v. Kerner." In
Haines, the Court held unanimously that such
allegations, "however inartfully pleaded,"
2
'
were to be held to "less stringent standards
than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.
22
Dismissal of a pro se complaint was held proper
only if "it appears beyond doubt that the plain-
tiff can prove no set of facts in support of his
claim which would entitle him to relief.
23
The Court ruled that Gamble's allegations
concerning medical personnel were insufficient
to state a constitutional claim. Since Gamble
had been examined and treated frequently by
medical officers, his complaint raised at most a
claim of medical malpractice not cognizable
under § 1983.24 The Court did not rule on the
sufficiency of the allegations against the correc-
tional officials.
2 5
16 429 U.S. at 106.
17 329 U.S. 459 (1947).
1s In a plurality opinion, the Court in Resweber
ruled that a second attempt to execute the con-
demned man would not be cruel and unusual punish-
ment because the miscarriage of the first had been
an "unforeseeable accident." Id. at 464.
'9 429 U.S. at 105 (quoting Gregg v. Georgia).
20 404 U.S. 519 (1972).
21 Id. at 520.
22 Id.
2 1Id. at 520-21.
24 429 U.S. at 107. For text of § 1983, see note 4
supra.
25 The Court's reasons for remanding rather than
deciding the case on the merits are open to specula-
tion. However, the decision to remand significantly
[Vol. 68
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Justice Stevens filed the only dissenting opin-
ion in Gamble.26 He did not quarrel with either
"the way this area of the law has developed
thus far, or with the probable impact of this
opinion."'27 Rather, he objected to the Court's
application of Haines and to the formulation of
the "deliberate indifference" standard. 28
Justice Stevens accused the Court of paying
lip service to Haines while abandoning its prin-
ciple. He maintained that Haines required the
Court to draw the inference that the health
care delivery system which spawned Gamble's
treatment might be wholly inadequate to meet
prisoners' needs.29 Prison officials should be
required to produce some evidence that Gam-
ble had not been a victim of that system. 30
Stevens objected to the "deliberate indiffer-
ence" standard because "the Court improperly
attach[ed] significance to the subjective motiva-
undermined any potential for the Court's ruling to
establish a definitive standard for the lower courts to
apply in weighing claims of deprivation of medical
care against guards and other non-medical person-
nel. The cases cited to illustrate the "deliberate indif-
ference" standard for prison officials involve conduct
so outrageous as to border on malice, and in each
case serious bodily injury was inflicted. See 429 U.S.
at 103-04 nn.10-12 for list of cases. Whether the
Court meant to limit claims to such extreme situations
is unclear.
26 429 U.S. at 108-17.
27 Id. at 108.
28 Justice Stevens also questioned the wisdom of
the grant of certiorari. He noted that by the Court's
own admission the circuits were in general agreement
as to the constitutional standard to be applied. Id. at
115.29 Id. at 110-12.
30 justice Stevens noted that this might be "another
instance of judicial haste which in the long run makes
waste." Id. at 113 (quoting Dioguardi v. Durning, 139
F.2d 774, 775 (2d Cir. 1944)). He observed:
Presumably, the Court's remand does not bar
Gamble from pursuing these charges [stemming
from his months in solitary confinement without
medical care], if necessary through filing a new
complaint or formal amendment of the present
complaint. The original complaint also alleged
that prison officials failed to comply with a
doctor's order.... Gamble's medical condition
is relevant to all these allegations. It is therefore
probable that the medical records will be pro-
duced and that testimony will be elicited about
Gamble's medical care. If the evidence should
show that he in fact sustained a serious injury
and received only pro forma care, he would
surely be allowed to amend his pleading to
reassert a claim against one or more of the
prison doctors.
Id. at 114 n.8.
tion of the defendant as a criterion for deter-
mining whether cruel and unusual punishment
has been inflicted."3 1 He concluded that subjec-
tive motivation might determine the appropri-
ate remedy in a case, but that violation of the
constitutional standard must turn on the char-
acter of the punishment inflicted.
32
The Supreme Court clearly indicated in Gam-
ble that the liberal construction requirements
of Haines will not be adhered to in the prison
context. A prisoner's pro se complaint will not
always be given the benefit of every doubt. By
establishing the high standard of "deliberate
indifference" the Court has ensured that few
prisoners will be able to claim that inadequate
medical care constitutes cruel and unusual pun-
ishment.
PRISONERS' FIRST AND FOURTEENTH
AMENDMENT RIGHTS
In Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners' Labor
Union, Inc., prison inmates brought suit under
42 U.S.C. § 19 83 " challenging North Carolina
Department of Correction regulations which
prohibited the activities of an inmate labor
union. The United States Supreme Court, in
an opinion written by Justice Rehnquist, held
that the regulations did not violate the pris-
oners' first or fourteenth amendment rights.
The North Carolina Prisoners' Labor Union
[the Union] was incorporated in 1974 for the
purpose of establishing a union at every prison
facility in the state. The Union sought to im-
prove working conditions through collective
bargaining and to resolve inmate grievances.-
Within four months over two thousand inmates
from forty separate facilities had become mem-
bers .
Although the State permitted individual
membership in the Union, it sought to prohibit
organized Union activities. The Department of
Correction promulgated regulations barring
Union meetings, bulk mailings of Union mate-
rials to inmates and membership solicitation .36
31 Id. at 116.
32 Id.
' 97 S. Ct. 2532. For text of § 1983, see note 4
supra.
'Id. at 2536 n.l. North Carolina law prohibits
collective bargaining with prison inmates with respect
to pay, hours of employment and terms of incarcer-
ation under N.C. GEN. STAT. § 95-98 (1975).
97 S. Ct. at 2536.36 Id.
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The Union brought suit in the District Court
for the Eastern District of North Carolina3 7 to
enjoin enforcement of the regulations. It also
sought declaratory relief and damages. The
Union claimed that the regulations violated its
members' and its own rights of free speech
and association.38 It also charged that the reg-
ulations denied them equal protection of the
law .
39
The district court held the regulations un-
constitutional. It relied on Pell v. Procunier,40
where the Supreme Court stated that "a prison
inmate retains those First Amendment rights
that are not inconsistent with his status as a
prisoner or with the legitimate penological ob-
jectives of the corrections system. ' 41 The dis-
trict court reasoned that if the penal system
did not find individual membership to be a
threat to institutional objectives, prohibiting
inmate solicitation for membership "borders
on the irrational."
42
Using the traditional balancing approach to
first amendment questions the court held that
prison officials had failed to justify the restric-
tions on inmate speech and association. It relied
on Procunier v. Martinez43 for the standard of
review of first amendment questions in the
prison context. In Martinez the Supreme Court
stated, "[T]he limitation of First Amendment
freedoms must be no greater than is necessary
or essential to the protection of the particular
governmental interest involved."44 The court
found that prison authorities failed to demon-
37 409 F. Supp. 937 (E.D.N.C. 1976). A three-judge
panel was convened pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 2281 &
2284 (1970).
381 Id. at 2537.
39 Id.
40 417 U.S. 817 (1974). In Pell, prison inmates and
news media challenged a California Department of
Correction regulation which prohibited media inter-
views with individually named inmates. The Court
upheld the dismissal of the media plaintiffs' com-
plaint and held that the regulation did not violate
inmate first amendment rights because it only af-
fected the mode of communication and not the
content.41 Id. at 822.
42 409 F. Supp. at 943.
43 416 U.S. 396 (1974). In Martinez, inmates chal-
lenged a mail censorship regulation which forbade
inmates to send letters which "unduly complain" or
"magnify grievances." Id. at 399 & n.2. The Court
held that the regulation was overly broad and did
not further any legitimate governmental objective.
Id. at 415.4 4 Id. at 413.
strate that the Union constituted a present or
imminent danger to any legitimate objectives
of the prison system. It noted that the correc-
tions authorities:
[S]incerely believe that the very existence of the
Union will increase the burdens of administra-
tion and constitute a threat of essential discipline
and control. They are apprehensive that in-
mates may use the Union to establish a power
bloc within the inmate population which could
be utilized to cause work slowdowns or stop-
pages or other undesirable concerted activity. 45
However, the court found that there was
enough authority 6 indicating the beneficial na-
ture of such organizations that it could form
"no firm conviction that an association of in-
mates is necessarily good or bad. ' 47 The court
concluded that the prison administrators' un-
differentiated fear of prisoners' unions was
insufficient justification for the restriction on
prisoners' rights of speech and association.
The prohibitions against meetings and bulk
mailings were invalidated on equal protection
grounds. Since the Jaycees and Alcoholics
Anonymous received such privileges, prison
authorities could not deny them to the Union
without demonstrating that the Union posed a
threat to prison objectives.4 The court ob-
41 409 F. Supp. at 942.
46 The court referred to P. KEvE, PRISON LIFE
AND HUMAN WORTH (1974), and to affidavits by Fred
Morrison, Jr. and James W. Mullen. Keve is Director
of Adult Corrections for the State of Delaware and
served as Commissioner of Corrections for Minne-
sota. Morrison is Executive Director of the North
Carolina Inmate Grievance Commission as well as
being a member of the Legislative Commission on
Sentencing, Criminal Punishment, and Rehabilita-
tion. Mullen is warden of the Rhode Island Adult
Correctional Institution, where an inmate association
is active.
41 Id. at 943.
48 The district court said:
In a free society, outside the walls, it is clear
that government may not pick and choose de-
pending upon its approval or disapproval of
the message or purpose of the group....
The question is more difficult in the prison
context, but we are inclined to think that the
same principle applies except where the activity
proscribed is shown to be detrimental to proper
penological objectives, subversive to good disci-
pline, or otherwise harmful.... [T]here is
nothing in this record to support a finding of
present danger to security and order. Absent
such an indication, we hold that the defendants
must accord to the Union and the inmate mere-
[Vol. 68
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served that the authorities could, of course,
regulate the time, place, and manner of Union
activities, as well as monitor meetings. More-
over, if the Union should prove a threat to
security, prison officials could "put down the
Union and its adherents to whatever extent
may be necessary .... 49
The Supreme Court granted direct review
on appeal by the North Carolina prison author-
ities. In a six-three decision, 0 the Court re-
versed the district court and held that the
regulations did not violate the first and four-
teenth amendment rights of the Union or its
members. The Court criticized the district
court for failing to give "appropriate deference
to the decisions of prison administrators and
appropriate recognition to the peculiar and
restrictive circumstances of penal confine-
ment."51 The Court noted that "[1]awful incar-
ceration brings about the necessary withdrawal
or limitation of many privileges and rights, a
retraction justified by the considerations un-
derlying our penal system."52 Emphasizing the
traditional "hands-off" attitude of the federal
judiciary,53 the Court said that any such limita-
tions must be considered in the context of the
"wide-ranging deference to be accorded the
decisions of prison administrators. 54  It
strongly disagreed with the district court's be-
lief that prison authorities undermined the
credibility of their fears by permitting individ-
ual membership in the Union. The lower court
had
considerably overstate[d] what appellants'
concession as to pure membership entails. Ap-
bers the same privileges accorded other organi-
zations of inmates-neither more nor less.
409 F. Supp. at 944-45 (citation omitted).49 Id. at 944.
50 Chief Justice Burger and Justices Stewart,
White, Blackmun, and Powell joined in the opinion
written by Mr. Justice Rehnquist. Chief Justice
Burger filed a concurring opinion. Justice Stevens
filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in
part. Justice Marshall filed a dissenting opinion in
which Justice Brennan joined.
51 97 S. Ct. at 2538.52 Id. (quoting Price v. Johnston, 334 U.S. 266, 285
(1948)).
- The Court's recent decisions prompted specula-
tion that the "hands-off' attitude was no longer
viable. See, e.g., Fox, The First Amendment Rights of
Prisoners, 63 J. CRIM. L.C. & P.S. 162 (1972), noted
by Justice Marshall, 97 S. Ct. at 2545 (Marshall, J.,
joined by Brennan, J. dissenting).
5 97 S. Ct. at 2538.
pellants permitted membership because of the
reasonable assumption that each individual pris-
oner could believe what he chose to believe,
and that outside individuals should be able to
communicate ideas and beliefs to individual in-
mates. Since a member qua member incurs no
dues or obligations-a prisoner apparently may
become a member simply by considering himself
a member-this position simply reflects the con-
cept that thought control, by means of prohibit-
ing beliefs, would not only be undesirable but
impossible .55
The toleration of individual membership,
therefore, did not "border on the irrational."
Prison authorities" reasonable belief that the
Union posed a threat to security justified the
restrictions on inmates' first amendment rights
and the different treatment accorded the Un-
ion and other groups operating in the prisons.
Addressing the specific claims presented, the
Court stated that "First Amendment free
speech rights [were] barely implicated in this
case," 56 and that "[a]n examination of the po-
tential restrictions on speech or association that
have been imposed by the regulations under
challenge, demonstrate [sic] that the restrictions
imposed are reasonable, and are consistent
with the inmates' status as prisoners and with
the legitimate operational considerations of the
institution .".
The Court held that the prohibition on mem-
bership solicitation did not violate the first
amendment. It concluded that solicitation in-
volved "more than the simple expression of
. . . the advantages or disadvantages of a Union
or its views; it is an invitation to collectively
engage in a legitimately prohibited activity."58
Therefore, the control of solicitation was seen
to be a reasonable and necessary means of
controlling organized activity of the Union.
Since only bulk mailings were prohibited,
there was no significant infringement on in-
mate free speech.5 9 Material sent first class to
Id. at 2539-40.
56 Id. at 2540.
5 7 Id.
58 Id. at 2541.
'9 The Court said that "[w]hile the District Court
relied on the cheaper bulk mailing. rates in finding
an equal protection violation . . . , it is clear that
losing these cost advantages does not fundamentally
implicatefree speech values." Id. at 2541 (emphasis in
original, citation omitted). The Court relied on the
availability of "other avenues of outside informational
flow by the Union." Id.
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individual inmates was not prohibited.6 0 How-
ever, if prison authorities had sought to forbid
individual mailings of Union materials on the
basis of the "no solicitation" rule, they would
be acting within permissible bounds. As the
Court stated, "[C]learly, if the appellants are
permitted to prohibit solicitation activities, they
may prohibit solicitation activities by means
which use the mails."61
The Court recognized that the right of asso-
ciation was "more directly implicated ' 62 than
that of free speech, but ruled that the prison
authorities' fears justified the restriction. More-
over, the Court held that the right of associa-
tion "may be curtailed whenever the institu-
tion's officials, in the exercise of their informed
discretion, reasonably conclude that such asso-
ciations . . . possess the likelihood of disruption
to prison order or stability, or otherwise inter-
fere with the legitimate penological objectives
of the prison environment.
6 3
Most importantly, with respect to all the first
amendment claims, the Court emphasized that
the burden was not on the prison authorities to
prove that their perception of danger was cor-
rect. "It is enough to say that they have not
been conclusively shown to be wrong in this
view." 4 The Court found that the prison offi-
cials' fears were reasonable and that the chal-
lenged regulations were sufficiently narrow. It
did not consider the district court's suggestion
that a less onerous means of protecting prison
interests was available through time, place, and
manner regulations.
The Court rejected the equal protection
claims on the basis of Greer v. Spock. 65 There
the Court held that a military base's refusal to
allow political groups to conduct activities did
not violate equal protection even though the
base allowed other civilian groups to sponsor
programs. Since a military base is not a "public
forum," authorities could make reasonable dis-
tinctions among groups insofar as their activi-
ties affected military objectives. In Jones the
Court declared that a prison was no more a
11 The Court noted that the district court believed
that the Union materials could not be mailed to
individual inmates if the materials solicited member-
ship. Id. at n.8.
61 Id.
62 Id. at 2541.
6 Id.
61 Id. at 2542.
65 424 U.S. 828 (1976).
"public forum" than a military base. Thus,
prison officials "need only demonstrate a ra-
tional basis for their distinctions between orga-
nizational groups."66
Justice Marshall, in a dissenting opinion, 7
criticized the Court for abandoning traditional
first amendment analysis. By subjecting restric-
tions on inmates' first amendment privileges to
minimal scrutiny, the Court doomed prisoners
to a gradual erosion of all constitutional rights.
He concluded that, even in the prison context,
restrictions on such rights must be justified as
a necessary means of furthering an important
state interest. The prison authorities had not
met that burden.'
Jones marks a significant shift in the Court's
attitude toward the judiciary's role in prison
reform. The Court has re-established a "hands-
off" policy in prison affairs. The degree of
deference given to prison administrators and
66 97 S. Ct. at 2543. The Court thus established
minimal rationality as the standard of review for
prison regulations claimed to violate inmates' first
and fourteenth amendment rights.
6
' Id. at 2545. (Marshall, J., joined by Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
68 Marshall sharply criticized the Court's twisting
of the Pell standard, pointing out that few, if any,
restrictions would fail to be "consistent with the
inmates' status as prisoners." Id. at 2546 (quoting 97
S. Ct. at 2540 (majority opinion)). Pell said that
prisoners retained all rights consistent with their
status, 417 U.S. at 822. Marshall also questioned the
degree of deference which should be accorded the
decisions of prison administrators. He pointed out
that the political nature of prison administration
would lead inevitably toward more restrictions in-
stead of less:
A warden seldom will find himself subject to
public criticism or dismissal because he need-
lessly repressed free speech; indeed, neither the
public nor the warden will have any way of
knowing when repression was unnecessary. But
a warden's job can be jeopardized and public
criticism is sure to come should disorder occur.
Consequently, prison officials inevitably will err
on the side of too little freedom.
97 S. Ct. at 2546 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
In support of his assertion that the Court must
regard prison administrators as no more than an
important source of expert information, Marshall
noted that the Court had adopted precisely that
stance in other cases in the last decade. E.g., Wolff
v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974); Cruz v. Beto, 405
U.S. 319 (1972); Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483
(1969); Lee v. Washington, 390 U.S. 333 (1968). In
his opinion, the Court's decision in Jones effectively




minimal scrutiny of their decisions bodes ill for
future prisoner claims of constitutional viola-
tions.
ACCESS TO THE COURTS
In Bounds v. Smith prison inmates in North
Carolina brought suit under 42 U.S.C. § 198369
claiming that the State's failure to provide ade-
quate access to legal materials and assistance
violated their first and fourteenth amendment
right of access to the courts.70 The Supreme
Court, in an opinion by Justice Marshall, held
that the constitutional right of meaningful ac-
cess to the courts7' required prison authorities
to establish prison law libraries for inmate use
or to provide an alternate form of legal assist-
ance.
The District Court for the Eastern District of
North Carolina, in an unpublished opinion,
granted summary judgment72 for the plaintiffs
on the basis of Younger v. Gilmore.73 In Gilmore,
69 430 U.S. at 817. For text of § 1983, see note 4
supra. This action was a consolidation of three suits.
70 538 F.2d 541, 542 (4th Cir. 1975).
71 The Supreme Court based this right on the
fourteenth amendment and did not consider the
first amendment claim.
72 430 U.S. at 818.
73 404 U.S. 15 (1971). In Younger v. Gilmore, the
Supreme Court affirmed per curiam the decision of
the District Court for the Northern District of Cali-
fornia in Gilmore v. Lynch, 319 F. Supp. 105 (D.C.N.
Cal. 1970). Prison inmates in Gilmore challenged the
sufficiency of law libraries provided for inmate use
claiming that the resources were so inadequate that
the inmates' right of access to the courts was substan-
tially impaired. The prison authorities maintained
that they were under no obligation to furnish any
legal materials and that resources made available
were not subject to judicial criticism. The district
court rejected this assertion and found the legal
materials completely inadequate to meet the legal
needs of the prisoners. California, in an effort to
establish uniformity among its prison libraries, had
promulgated a list of materials which were to be kept
at each facility. All other law books were to be
destroyed. The list included various California codes,
none of them annotated, and the rules of various
courts. However, no state or federal digests or re-
porters were included, nor were there any volumes
of the United States Code. No sources of current
information, such as U.S. Law Week, were included.
The plan called for the resources of the prison
libraries to be supplemented by the California State
Library. However, the state library reserved only
one set of state and federal reporters for inmate use,
and many volumes had been stolen.
The district court reasoned that, even though a
petition for relief from a federal court did not require
the Supreme Court held per curiam that the
constitution required prison authorities to pro-
vide inmates with access to legal materials or
assistance. The district court in Bounds found
that the State's only prison law library was
"severely inadequate" and that no other form
of legal assistance was provided to inmates.
74
The court ordered the North Carolina Depart-
ment of Correction to design a plan which
would meet the legal needs of its inmates. The
court explicitly declined to mandate the provi-
sion of law libraries, noting that an alternative
plan utilizing legal assistance workers would
also be acceptable. The Department of Correc-
tion developed a library plan geared toward its
de-centralized prison system. Inmates would
be transported to seven centrally-located law
libraries to do their legal research. Approxi-
mately 350 inmates would be able to use the
libraries each week. The plan established an
appointment system so that the maximum wait-
ing period for use of the libraries would be no
more than three or four weeks. Inmates under
court deadlines apparently would receive spe-
cial consideration. In addition, the State
planned to train inmates to assist others with
research and typing. The proposed libraries
included legal reference works suggested by
the American Correctional Association, Amer-
ican Bar Association, and the American Asso-
ciation of Law Libraries.
7 5
The district court approved the plan with
only minor changes.76 The State then applied
citations or sophisticated legal arguments, it was
nonetheless important for inmates to have a cui-rent
source of information. Such information would allow
the inmate to determine whether he had a claim,
what facts he must allege, and to what court he must
address his petition. To deny access to this informa-
tion impermissibly abridged the right of access to the
courts. The court was astute to point out that law
libraries were not the only solution to the problem
and suggested that California might implement a
program utilizing public defenders, law students, or
other legal workers to assist inmates. 319 F. Supp. at
110-11.
74 430 U.S. at 818.75 Id. at 819-20 n.4. The Supreme Court noted
that some significant works had been omitted. The
prisoners urged the Court to require that the list of
materials be expanded and that a circulating library
be established.
76 430 U.S. at 820. The Court ordered that more
copies of the U.S.C.A. Habeas Corpus and Civil
Rights Act volumes be made available and that ad-
vance sheets to reporters should be retained to build
up a duplicate set of each.
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for a grant from the Law Enforcement Assist-
ance Agency (LEAA) to implement its proposal
and simultaneously appealed the district court
ruling. The inmates also appealed the ruling
insofar as the State was not required to furnish
a law library at each prison or legal assistance
to inmates. The Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court deci-
sion."
The Supreme Court granted certiorari on
the State's petition for review.7 8 In a six-three7 9
decision, the Court affirmed the court of ap-
peals decision, declining to overrule Younger v.
Gilmore.
The Court based its decision on Ex parte
Hull,"' which established beyond doubt that
there was a federal constitutional right of access
to the courts. 81 It also noted that recent deci-
sions have reaffirmed that right and have im-
posed substantial financial burdens on the
states to protect it. States have been required
71 538 F.2d 541 (4th Cir. 1975). The court of appeals
found that the plan discriminated against women
inmates and ordered that the discrimination be elim-
inated. 538 F.2d at 545. The court did not cite any
specific authority for its affirmance. However, it did
say that Younger v. Gilmore did not require prisons to
furnish counsel to inmates at the complaint-writing
stage of their litigation.
78 425 U.S. 910 (1976). The grant of certiorari was
apparently based on the Court's desire to clarify
Younger v. Gilmore, where it issued only a two-para-
graph per curiam opinion. The Court in Bounds
noted, however, that the decision in Gilmore was
unanimous and rendered after full briefing and oral
argument. 430 U.S. at 829.7
1 Justices White, Blackmun, Powell, Brennan, and
Stevens joined in the opinion of Justice Marshall.
Justice Powell also filed a concurring opinion. Chief
Justice Burger filed a dissenting opinion. Justices
Stewart and Rehnquist filed dissenting opinions in
which Chief Justice Burger joined.
80 312 U.S. 546 (1941).
81 430 U.S. at 821-22. In Hull, the Court held
unconstitutional a prison regulation that required all
legal documents to be submitted to the "legal investi-
gator" of the Parole Board. The regulation provided
that the investigator determine that a petition was
"well-drawn" before it could be submitted to the
appropriate court. The Court held that:
[T]he state and its officers may not abridge or
impair petitioners' right to apply to a federal
court for a writ of habeas corpus. Whether a
petition for writ of habeas corpus addressed to
a federal court is properly drawn and what
allegations it must contain are questions for that
court alone.
312 U.S. at 549.
to provide free transcripts,8 2 waive docket
fees,' and, in some instances, provide coun-
sel. 4 The Court concluded that these decisions
guaranteed not only a naked right of access to
the courts but also a right of meaningful access.
The Department of Correction argued that
allowing prisoners to assist one another in the
preparation of legal documents, as required by
Johnson v. Avery"5 and Wolff v. McDonnell,"1'
fulfilled its obligation to ensure inmate access
to the courts. The Supreme Court rejected this
argument declaring that in Johnson and Wolff
"we did not attempt to set forth the full breadth
of the right of access. 8 7 The question of legal
82 Gardner v. California, 393 U.S. 367 (1969);
Draper v. Washington, 372 U.S. 487 (1963); Griffin
v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
' Smith v. Bennett, 365 U.S. 708 (1961); Burns v.
Ohio, 360 U.S. 252 (1959).
1 Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972);
Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963); Gideon v.
Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
85 393 U.S. 483 (1969). In Johnson, an inmate of a
Tennessee correctional facility challenged a prison
regulation which prohibited inmates from assisting
one another in the preparation of legal documents.
No other form of legal assistance was provided to
inmates at the initial stage of preparing their claims.
Johnson asserted that the rule impaired the right of
access to the courts. Prison authorities attempted to
justify the regulation on the basis of their interest in
maintaining prison discipline and the State's interest
in regulating the practice of law. The Supreme Court
struck down the regulation, holding that it impermis-
sibly impaired the right of access to the courts by
illiterate and functionally illiterate inmates. The
Court further held that while it was not necessary to
allow 'jail-house lawyers" to function, if the State
provided no alternative means of legal assistance to
inmates unable to prepare their own claims, it could
not prohibit inmates from assisting one another.
Prison authorities remained free to regulate such
assistance with regard to time, place, and manner.
86 418 U.S. 539 (1974). In Wolff, inmates challenged
regulations which provided for an inmate Legal As-
sistant to help inmates prepare petitions for writs of
habeas corpus and prohibited other inmates from
functioning as 'jail-house lawyers." The inmates ar-
gued that Johnson v. Avey prevented the State from
imposing such a ban. The inmates further argued
that, if the ban is to be upheld, the inmate Legal
Assistant must also be able to help prepare civil
rights claims. The Court held the ban would be
permissible with that proviso under the "alternative"
approach ofJohnson, and remanded the case to the
district court for findings as to whether the Legal
Assistant would be available to inmates for the prep-
aration of both habeas corpus and civil rights actions.
87 430 U.S. at 824.
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materials was not before the Court in either of
those cases.88
The Department of Correction further ar-
gued that since Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure 9 only required that a pleading
contain a brief statement of the claim and its
basis, legal reference materials were totally un-
necessary. The Court summarily rejected this
argument, stating that the realities of the legal
system impose burdens on pro se plaintiffs
which make the right a mere formality if access
to legal resources is denied:
Although it is essentially true, as petitioners
argue, that a habeas corpus petition or civil
rights complaint need only set forth facts giving
rise to the cause of action ... it hardly follows
that a law library or other legal assistance is not
essential to frame such documents. It would
verge on incompetence for a lawyer to file an
initial pleading without researching such issues
as jurisdiction, venue, standing, exhaustion of
remedies, proper parties plaintiff and defend-
ant and types of relief available. Most impor-
tantly, of course, a lawyer must know what the
law is in order to determine whether a colorable
claim exists, and if so, what facts are necessary
to state a cause of action.
If a lawyer must perform such preliminary
research, it is no less vital for apro se prisoner. 90
Although the allegations of a pro se pleading
are construed more liberally than an attorney-
prepared petition, it is necessary for the plain-
tiff to "set forth a nonfrivolous claim me'eting
all procedural prerequisites, since the court
may pass on the complaint's sufficiency before
allowing filing informa pauperis and may dismiss
the case if it is deemed frivolous ."91 Moreover,
the Court deemed it important that a pro se
plaintiff be able to respond to any citations and
legal arguments which may be contained in the
State's answer to his complaint.
" The Court also noted that its decision was sup-
ported by another right of access case, Procunier v.
Martinez, 416 U.S. 396 (1974). In addition to invali-
dating a mail censorship regulation, the Court held
that a prison regulation which barred access to pris-
oners by paralegals and other non-attorney legal
workers unless these workers were associated with
legal assistance clinics was unconstitutional. The
Court reasoned that requiring attorneys to attend to
every detail of an inmate's case might adversely affect
the attorneys' willingness to represent inmate clients.
19 FED. R. Civ. P. 8(a).
90 430 U.S. at 825-26.
91 Id. at 826.
The State argued that Ross v. Moffitt,92 should
be applied to limit the obligation of the State to
ensure inmate access to the courts. There, the
Court held that the appointment of counsel to
inmates seeking discretionary appeal from their
convictions was not constitutionally required.
The Supreme Court, however, distinguished
Moffitt on the grounds that an inmate seeking
discretionary appeal would usually have access
to pertinent transcripts and briefs filed in ear-
lier appeals of right. Thus, he would be able to
present his claims well enough for an appellate
court to determine whether such an appeal
should be granted. Here the Court was "con-
cerned in large part with original actions seek-
ing new trials, release from confinement or
vindication of fundamental civil rights. Rather
than presenting claims that have been passed
on by two courts, they frequently raise hereto-
fore unlitigated issues."93 The Court concluded
that the provision of law libraries or some
alternate form of legal assistance for inmates
was constitutionally required.
Three Justices dissented9 on the grounds
92 417 U.S. 600 (1974).
93 430 U.S. at 827.
' Chief Justice Burger, id. at 833, dissented on
the grounds that there was in fact no constitutional
right of access to the courts. He found at most a
statutory right to collateral review of a state convic-
tion. See Swain v. Pressley, 430 U.S. 384 (1977); Stone
v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976). He concluded that,
since the right was purely statutory in nature, "the
duty of the State is merely negative; it may not act in
such a manner as to interfere with the individual
exercise of such federal rights.... [This] is, how-
ever, materially different from requiring it to provide
affirmative assistance for their exercise." Id. at 835.
Justice Rehnquist, id. at 837, also found no more
than a statutory right to attack a state conviction in
federal court. However, his treatment of Johnson v.
Avery, Wolff v. McDonnell and Procunier v. Martinez
indicated that he recognized that the Court was
concerned with something more than the federally-
created right of collateral review. However, his read-
ing of those cases differed substantially from that of
the majority. He found them to:
[D]epend on the principle that the State, having
already incarcerated the convict and thereby
virtually eliminated his contact with people out-
side the prison walls, may not further limit
contacts which would otherwise be permitted
simply because such contacts would aid the in-
carcerated prisoner in preparation of a petition
seeking judicial relief from the conditions or
terms of his confinement.
Id. at 838.
This is a highly questionable reading of the princi-
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that the right of access was not constitutional
but statutory in nature. Therefore, they in-
sisted that there was no affirmative duty on the
part of the states to assist the prisoner in
asserting his statutory right to collaterally attack
his conviction in federal court. None of the
dissenters, however, squarely faced the prob-
lem of the indigent, pro se petitioner seeking to
vindicate constitutional rights infringed by the
correctional system.95
The Court's reaffirmation of the right of
meaningful access to the courts guarantees
prisoners the right to legal resources in prepar-
ing their claims of constitutional violations.
However, the decision announced may have a
serious and detrimental impact on the future
treatment of pro se petitions. Although the
Court's opinion suggests that counsel is unnec-
essary, it held that legal reference materials
ple of those cases. There was no indication that the
regulations challenged there were motivated by any
intent to cut prisoners off from the courts by making
it more difficult for them to prepare their petitions.
The Court noted that, in each case, institutional
security was offered as the justification for the restric-
tions placed on inmates.
Justice Stewart, id. at 836, was less certain that the
right was not constitutional, but said that in any
event the remedy was inappropriate. He foresaw
"the filing of pleadings heavily larded with irrelevant
legalisms -possessing the veneer but lacking the sub-
stance of professional competence." Id.
91 Justice Powell's concurring opinion, id. at 833,
emphasized that the Court's decision in no way af-
fected the types of claims which could be heard in
federal court.
were vital for an inmate to state his claim
effectively. It is disturbing to note that the
Court arrived at this conclusion by drawing an
analogy to what would be required of an attor-
ney filing the same petition. It is entirely possi-
ble that, because of the increased availability to
inmates of legal materials and assistance, pro se
petitions will be held to a higher standard than
in the past.
CONCLUSION
Gamble, Jones, and Bounds will greatly alter
the relationship between prisons, prisoners,
and the courts. Prisoners will have greater
access to the courts to air their claims but may
have no "substantive rights to assert once they
get there." 6 It appears that the pro se petition
will be held to a higher standard of sufficiency
of pleadings than has traditionally been re-
quired under Haines v. Kerner. At the very
least, the Court has effectively removed many
areas of prison life from judicial scrutiny. By
using the minimal scrutiny standard to judge
prison regulations, the Court has turned its
back on prison reform through the judiciary.
In leaving the task to the legislature, the Court
has abdicated its responsibility to prisoners and
has reneged on its assertion that "[tihere is no
iron curtain drawn between the Constitution
and the prisoners of this country." 7
96 Jones v. N.C. Prisoners' Labor Union, Inc., 97
S. Ct. at 2549 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
11 Id. (quoting Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539,
555-56 (1974)).
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